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Overview
The prospects around hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and future oil concessions have been 
accelerating in Somalia since 2012. The potential in this sector is already an important 
factor in political dynamics in the country, as seen for example in the ongoing maritime 
dispute with Kenya, as well as through the interests of several different countries and the 
involvement of a number of commercial actors.  
This memo argues that, while legislation and regulation, at least nominally, has been 
progressing in the last 3-4 years, it remains unfinished but now frames the operation 
of the political marketplace, with control over the Ministry of Petroleum and Somalia 
Petroleum Agency (SPA) constituting the key motivations of political elites and associated 
bargaining. Control of these ‘institutions’ enables access to informal flows of money as 
well as allows control over the allocation of sub-contracts, which are likely to come from 
the various grants and loans that will become available through the debt relief process. 
Control over contracts is a major issue in Somalia’s political economy and political 
marketplace.
The memo highlights the underlying dynamics behind the regulatory developments 
and the push for – arguably premature – auctioning. It suggests that speculation is 
feeding the political marketplace in Somalia; speculation in future oil wealth (in the short-
term through foreign oil companies that are willing to pay access fees, rents and other 
inducements up front). In addition, speculation on the operational sub-contracts that 
exploration will generate (logistics, security, accommodation and hospitality). These 
drivers are elevated in the current pre-election period, where potential unconditional cash 
injections and the political trading around key positions – and the control or influence of 
contracts – in the emerging ‘institutions’ are important dynamics.
The establishment of the federal government in Mogadishu, in 2012, has changed the 
organisation of this sector bringing it under a central authority where for years previously 
arrangements were made with regional authorities. In addition, past controversies 
associated with Soma Oil (Coastal Exploration) and TGS (Spectrum) still cast a shadow 
over the Somali petroleum sector and serve a useful purpose in highlighting the 
reputational risks of opaque engagement in this area and the need for proper regulation 
and oversight.
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Analytical framework and methodology 
1. The political marketplace framework outlines that transactional politics is more important 
than institution-building in contexts such as Somalia, and that new resources, such as from 
hydrocarbon prospects are likely to become - or are already part of -the political budgets, 
calculations and networks of Somali actors.1 In this light, while legislation and regulation 
play a part in organising the sector and associated political dynamics, this is often to provide 
the appearance that formal, technical requirements are in place, disguising the real political 
processes taking place behind the scenes.2 
2. The role of mineral rents in the organisation and operation of political marketplaces is often 
extremely important as can be seen in other contexts; in Sudan for example, control of oil and 
gold drove dynamics in this marketplace.3 In the case of Somalia, the short-term and longer-term 
potential rents associated with the oil/gas sector are drawing in commercial investment and 
political positioning. The dynamics of the political marketplace determine how that positioning 
plays out, with this memo suggesting that the President’s office (and allies) is exerting a 
centralising hold where previously these rents were decentralised. 
3. The memo is based on 39 interviews with a range of key informants, including Somali analysts, 
long-term aid experts, government officials (present and former), businesspeople, and oil sector 
experts. The interviews were carried out remotely between March and August 2020, as well as 
in person in Mogadishu, by an experienced researcher. A range of media sources, published 
documents and reports as well as other grey literature were consulted for the study.
Background
4. From the 1970s, geologists have demonstrated that Somalia has a promising geology for 
hydrocarbons.4  The most promising areas for oil and gas prospecting by the 1980s was believed 
to be found in eight petroleum basins.5  More recently, the prospects of offshore deposits were 
surveyed in 2014 by Soma Oil (now renamed Coastal Exploration)6 and Spectrum Geo (acquired 
in 2019 by TGS of Houston) in 2015, showing that the prospects of offshore oil is promising 
(see Map 1).7
5. The risk that politically influenced positioning around potential oil resources could deepen 
Somalia’s underlying tensions and lead to conflict was emphasised in a UN report in 2014 which 
recommended a moratorium on oil licensing until Somalia had the political and institutional 
stability to manage the vast funds that could be generated.8 Post-civil war initiatives to regulate 
the oil and gas sector have been ongoing since 2008 and are important to the operations of 
the political marketplace as well as to the perceptions of progress to reach critical benchmarks 
by the international community. In 2012, a new Petroleum Law had to be drafted to bring the 
2008 law in accordance with the new provisional constitution (Article 44), which stated that 
the allocation of natural resources must be negotiated and jointly agreed upon by the Federal 
Government and  the Federal Member States together.9 
1 See: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/crp-memos/PMF-TOC-Feb-2020.pdf 
2 In another CRP report, the concept of the ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ was used to illustrate the disconnect between the technical and political 
aspects of food/cash aid analysis and programming. See: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103138/ 
3 See: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101291/ 
4 Barnes, Sydney U. 1976. “Geology and Oil Prospects of Somalia, East Africa.”
5 Hussein, A.A. (2012) Somalia’s Oil and Gas Potential - A frontier country that will be open for oil and gas exploration in 2013, December 27, 2012, 
https://hiiraan.com/op4/2012/dec/27479/somalia_s_oil_and_gas_potential.aspx 
6 Soma Oil actually only facilitated and paid for the survey, which sub-contracted SeaBird to do the actual survey.
7 Kearns, H. Berryman, J. Hodgson, N. and Rodriguez, K. (2016) Offshore Somalia: East Africa’s Oil Frontier, Spectrum, GeoExpro Magazine, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, 2016 https://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2016/05/offshore-somalia-east-africa-s-oil-frontier; Davidson, Lindsay & Arthur, T. & 
Smith, G. & Tubb, S. (2017). Geology and hydrocarbon potential of offshore SE Somalia. Petroleum Geoscience. 24. petgeo2016-154. 10.1144/
petgeo2016-154. accessed at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320985861_Geology_and_hydrocarbon_potential_of_offshore_SE_
Somalia
8 See UN Monitoring Group Report: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1199912/1226_1426687824_n1452986-727.pdf 
9 Reitano, T. and Shaw M. (2013), Briefing: Peace, Politics and Petroleum in Somalia, African Affairs, October 2013, Vol. 112, No. 449 (October 
2013), pp. 666-675 (by Oxford University Press).
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Map 1.10 Potential Oil and Gas Areas
(Source: Map design and adaptation based on the reviewed literature by Joakim Gundel, 2020.) 
6. However, a new Petroleum Law was not passed by the Parliament until May 2019, and the 
Upper House did not pass it until January 2020. It was finally ratified and signed by President 
Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo on February 8, 2020.11  Delays in the legislative process 
concerned the content of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), Resource Sharing 
Agreement (RSA) and the establishment of the regulatory institutions, such as the Somali 
Petroleum Authority (SPA); these in turn concern the relative power of central vis-à-vis regional 
authorities in the still nascent federal arrangement in Somalia.
7. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (UN SEMG) reported in October 2014 that  
increasing commercial activity in the oil and gas sector in Somalia without a resolution to 
constitutional and legal disputes surrounding the control of natural resources increased the 
risk of conflict.12 In 2015, the UN SEMG again raised these issues regarding the Soma Oil 
agreement which led to an investigation by the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and caused 
further delay to the legislative process. A report by the Adam Smith Institute (ASI), in 2014, 
raised many of the same issues as the UN SEMG, and made a number of recommendations 
including in the area of technical support and the need for ‘constitutional consensus’ as a 
precondition to such support.13 
8. The issues raised by the ASI and UN Monitoring Group reports prompted international partners 
to engage with the FGS on developing the legal frameworks for the oil sector. The World 
Bank (WB) took the lead on this in 2016 and produced a review of the legal framework for the 
petroleum sector. One of the key recommendations of their report was that a consultative 
process with the FMS needed to take place regarding the powers of the various organs with 
respect to petroleum administration, ownership and revenue allocation.14 The WB report also 
suggested that the petroleum law should set the main principles for contracting and that a 
model PSA should be developed. Due to the risks of creating dangerous and destabilizing 
competition between the various actors, it was recommended that no exploratory drilling by 
international oil companies would be permitted until a new legal and fiscal framework for 
petroleum was agreed upon. 
10 Obbia Basin (corresponding to the Mudug Basin and Somali Embayment), Coriole Basin (corresponding to the Somali Coastal Basin), and the 
Juba-Lamu Basin (corresponding to the Lamu Embayment).
11 http://somalialicensinground.com/wp-content/uploads/SOMALI-PETROLEUM-LAW-2020-2.pdf
12 See: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1199912/1226_1426687824_n1452986-727.pdf
13 Adam Smith International (2014), Needs Assessment for the Development of Somalia’s Extractive Industries, March 2014, Adam Smith 
International.
14 World Bank (2016), Review of the legal, regulatory, and fiscal framework of Somalia for the Petroleum Sector, Federal Republic of Somalia, 
FINAL REPORT, 4 August 2016, World Bank.
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9. Hence, a Revenue Sharing Agreement (RSA) was negotiated between the Federal 
Government (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS) in Baidoa, in June 2018.15 The 
international partners, World Bank  and IMF (who by then had been engaged in the debt 
relief process) had used the debt relief process, which has been underway for some years in 
Somalia, as a lever to encourage agreement.16 The RSA was not passed by legislation until 
20 May 2019.17 It established that the FGS will retain 55% of revenue from future offshore oil 
production and 30% from onshore output, with the FMS and the local communities receiving 
the remainder. This was written into the new Petroleum Law passed in February 2020. 
However, the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) raised concern that there could be 
significant disparities in the revenue shares between the FMSs, and therefore advised in June 
2020 that the terms of the agreement be reviewed periodically.18 Areas of the RSA remain 
contentious. For example, Puntland believes the Petroleum Law breaches Article 44 of the 
2012 Constitution, which declares that the principles of federalism rather than centralism 
should be the key principle of governance.19 
10. The Soma Oil controversy is an important reminder of the complications of engaging 
in an unregulated environment. The promising offshore reserves were clearly sparking 
impatience,20 not only from the Government officials, but also from UK based Soma Oil & 
Gas and Norwegian Spectrum Geo. Both companies had been pushing and assisting the 
government to initiate the oil licensing process, in their attempts at acquiring their rewards 
for their support to the Ministry of Petroleum. While sale of survey data was the business 
interest of Spectrum, Soma Oil, a UK company which involved the ex-PM, Hassan Khaire, 
attempted to gain access to 12 oil blocks (See Map 2) while also dictating the terms of the 
production sharing agreement (PSA).21 This event has ultimately served a useful purpose as 
it highlights the reputational risks of opaque engagement in this area and the need for proper 
regulation and oversight.
15 The formal title was the Agreement on Ownership, Management and Sharing of Revenues from the Natural Resources of the Country (Oil & 
Minerals) - also called the Baidoa Agreement.
16 See CRP memo on debt relief and the political marketplace: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme/
publications/memos 
17 Somalia Moves Step Closer to Reviving Oil Sector with New Terms, Bloomberg, 28 June 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-06-28/somalia-moves-step-closer-to-reviving-oil-sector-with-new-terms
18 Financial Governance Report 2020, Federal Government of Somalia, World Bank, EU, IMF, AfDB, July 2020. https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/
files/2020-08/Financial%20Governance%20Report%202020%20-%20English%20Report.pdf
19 Financial Governance Report 2020, Federal Government of Somalia, World Bank, EU, IMF, AfDB, July 2020. https://mof.gov.so/sites/default/
files/2020-08/Financial%20Governance%20Report%202020%20-%20English%20Report.pdf
20 The seismic surveys conducted by Soma Oil & Gas and Spectrum Geo, suggest that Somalia has promising oil reserves along the Indian 
Ocean coast, between the cities of Garad and Kismayo. Total offshore deposits could be as high as 100 billion barrels. See Somalia Readies 
for Oil Exploration, Still Working on Petroleum Law, Voice of America, February 13, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-readies-oil-
exploration-still-working-petroleum-law 
21 Announced on 6 August 2013 of the Oil and Gas Agreement Signed between Somalia and Soma Oil, according to a presentation by Soma 
Oil & Gas entitled Unlocking Somalia’s Potential, at Eastern African Oil Conference in Nairobi, 29-30 April 2014. https://www.voanews.com/
africa/somalia-readies-oil-exploration-still-working-petroleum-law
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Map 2. Soma Oil Blocks
(Source: Map design and adaptation by Joakim Gundel, 2020)
11. Despite the emphasis that is being placed on regulation, Somali authorities still appear to 
be unduly rushing the oil licensing process. A February 2019 oil and gas conference, held in 
London, took place with a model Production Sharing Agreement presented, but with neither 
the legal framework nor institutions in place.22 The FGC raised concerns about the PSA 
because it was different from the previously designed model and was not aligned with the 
Procurement Law. 
12. A requirement of the new Petroleum Law is that a regulating institution - the Somali 
Petroleum Authority (SPA) - is established within six months from the date of the law’s 
ratification,23 which would be by the launch of the Oil Licensing Round in August 2020. 
Henceforth, the responsibility of negotiating oil exploration and production contracts and 
concessions would lie with the SPA. However, the board of the SPA, its Chairman and CEO 
was not appointed until July 30, only a few days after the Parliament had dismissed PM 
Hassan Khaire, who resigned under duress on July 25. This was controversial because 
according to Article 97(4) of the provisional constitution,24 the cabinet, which is the only 
authority that can make such appointments, is effectively dissolved if the PM is removed. 
The appointment was therefore made by a Cabinet that de jure was dissolved by law and 
thus not legitimate. 
13. The composition of the SPA has raised questions among many observers, where Article 
19 (3b) states that the members of the SPA must be selected for their knowledge, 
professionalism, competence, and integrity. This does not appear to be the case. Article 
19 (3d) is particularly important for understanding why the setting up of the SPA is a key 
transactional element in the political marketplace because it states that the members of the 
SPA shall hold office - assuming good behaviour - for a period of four years, that is beyond 
the forthcoming elections. If this is respected, placing favoured candidates in this agency 
would be advantageous to the incumbent ruling cabal,25 because it would enable them to 
maintain influence in the oil sector even if they lose the elections.
22 Financial Governance Report 2020, Federal Government of Somalia, World Bank, EU, IMF, AfDB, July 2020. https://mof.gov.so/sites/
default/files/2020-08/Financial%20Governance%20Report%202020%20-%20English%20Report.pdf
23 Federal Republic of Somalia, Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Somali Petroleum Law, Signed February 2020, Mogadishu, 
Somalia 
24 Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia
25 The ruling cabal were often referred to by Somalis as FFK  (“Farmajo, Fahad & Khaire”);, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farma-
jo), (now ex-) Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire and the Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Agency, Fahad Yasin Dahir).
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14. Since 2017, strains between the FGS and the FMSs have been widely reported reflecting the 
tensions between centralized and decentralized power, with the incumbent FGS representing 
a centralizing ‘turn’ in Somalia’s political evolution (supported by Ethiopia and Eritrea); the 
heavily contested elections in South West State (SWS) and Jubbaland being the prime 
examples.26 Influence by the FGS over the FMSs has included appointments within the SPA. 
Having gained influence over SWS, Galmadug and Hirshabelle, the FGS was able to rush the 
new Petroleum Law through the Upper House, which the President was able to sign quickly 
on 8 February 2020.
15. In terms of implications for the political marketplace analysis, two elements emerged as 
important: 
a)	 Ensuring the launch of the oil licensing round in the hope of signing several PSA’s to 
obtain funds to finance the upcoming election campaigns. 
b)	 Ensuring that it is “your people” who sit in the controlling positions of the SPA (which 
maintains more permanency than the Minister of Petroleum) to secure control over 
licensing and contracting negotiations.
16. Finally, although the Petroleum Law has been passed through the legislature and signed 
by the President, and the SPA board has been appointed (although controversially), the 
regulatory and institutional frameworks are still not entirely in place, and past practices still 
cast a shadow over the prospects of oil licensing and exploration in Somalia. These are listed 
in Annex I. 
Key Actors in the Hydrocarbon Sector in Somalia
Oil Companies 
17. Somalia has never had the commercial companies and political leadership with available 
capital and capability to pursue oil and gas production on their own. Exploration for oil and 
gas has therefore been driven forward by a combination of foreign oil companies, foreign 
states, international organizations such as the World Bank, and local Somali actors and the 
Government(s) of Somalia trying to attract investments.27 
18. The most important “firms” in the oil sector are the so-called Oil Majors. Many of these 
household names were involved in Somalia in the 1960s and 70s. Following the collapse 
of the state in 1991, Conoco-Phillips, Amoco (BP since 2001), Shell (Pecten), Chevron, ENI 
(Agip) and TOTAL all declared “force majeure” until Somalia become stable again. The most 
important block concessions in February 1991 (see Map 3) were held by Pecten (now in joint 
venture Shell/Exxon), Conoco-Philips, Chevron, Amoco (Now BP), and ENI (Agip).
26 See: https://www.somtribune.com/2018/12/27/icg-blames-villa-somalia-on-muscling-in-on-southwest-election-inflaming-crisis/; https://
www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia 
27 See for  World Bank (1988), Petroleum Exploration Promotion Project, Project Completion Report, December 8, 1988, and Reitano, T. and 
Shaw M. (2013), Briefing: Peace, Politics and Petroleum in Somalia, African Affairs, October 2013, Vol. 112, No. 449 (October 2013), pp. 666-
675 (by Oxford University Press).
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Map 3. Concessions held by the Oil Majors from 1991 (including TOTAL’s 2001 concession with 
the TNG) 
 
(Source: Map design by Joakim Gundel, 2020)
19. Over the last 2-3 decades different national and regional authorities have signed agreements 
with major and minor companies, complicating the concessionary landscape.28 For example, 
in February 2001, TOTAL signed an exploration agreement with the Transitional National 
Government (TNG).  The agreement reportedly granted TOTAL the right to explore in the Indian 
Ocean off southern Somalia (See Map 3), but also triggered more than a decade of disputes 
between various transitional federal governments and the provincial authorities regarding 
the rights to oil. In 2012, the TFG Minister for Petroleum, informed the oil companies who 
had claimed “force majeure” that their legacy concessions would remain effective if they 
were interested and encouraged them to return.  The letter also specified that any permits 
or contracts acquired after 1991 were considered invalid.  This also invalidated all licenses 
entered by smaller companies, some of whom have signed agreements with authorities in 
Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug.
20. To date, only Shell/Exxon has actively claimed a continued interest and made an agreement 
with the Ministry of Petroleum; signed in June 2019, a settlement letter confirms their exclusive 
petroleum exploration and production rights over the offshore blocks in Somalia under a 
concession agreement that has been under force majeure since 1991 (see Map 2).29  The letter 
enables a payment to be made for the renewal of the rights. In October 2019, Shell and Exxon 
reportedly paid USD 1.7 million in retrospective charges to the Government of Somalia to 
maintain this concession. BP (Amoco), CONOCO and ENI (Agip) had previously confirmed their 
interest in retaining their old concessions, but further developments are not yet clear.  
21. The Oil Majors do not yet appear to have been playing any pro-active role in trying to re-activate 
their old concessions or pursue explorations in other areas of Somalia. The is due to the 
both the security risks and the unclear legal and institutional frameworks and where smaller 
companies are less restricted by these factors. The recent decline in oil prices associated with 
28 Oil Contracts: The deals and companies in Somalia, by T. Rooble, Goobjoog News, August 9, 2015. http://goobjoog.com/english/oil-contracts-
the-deals-and-companies-in-somalia/
29 Somalia says Shell, Exxon agree to pay $1.7 million for oil blocks lease, Reuters, October 29, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
somalia-oil/somalia-says-shell-exxon-agree-to-pay-17-million-for-oil-blocks-lease-idUSKBN1X70V9 
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Covid-19 will add to this risk perception. Shell and Conoco have occasionally responded to 
some of the smaller companies when they have encroached on their concessions under 
force majeure to protect them.30  But other than that, they have remained largely passive. 
However, this may change as the FGS intensifies its licencing.  
22. Major oil companies are known to act in coordination with their respective national 
governments. While these relationships are opaque, it is possible and even likely that 
geopolitical and some commercial interests are part of the underlying international 
engagement in Somalia in this sector. 
23. The oil and gas industry is also populated by smaller companies who either work on behalf 
of the oil majors or independently. These are companies with the risk appetite to operate in 
contexts which carry significant operational risks for the oil majors. Their strategy usually 
involves exploration and finding oil, in order that their interests are either bought out by oil 
majors, or so that they can partner with oil majors to co-develop finds. These companies are 
not able to raise the sizeable investments required to start oil production and are therefore 
not very useful partners if future oil extraction is to benefit development in Somalia. 
24. Hence, while the Oil Majors have remained inactive since 1990, exploration activities have 
been driven by these smaller adventurous companies hoping to ‘hit the jackpot’. Most 
of these companies have been brought in through connections made by Somali actors, 
particularly in Puntland, Somaliland and present-day Galmudug. There are many examples of 
companies who have been active in this small-scale exploration.31 
25. In addition to these companies, Norwegian Spectrum Geo (now TGS) was contracted by the 
FGS to carry out seismic surveys in 2015.32 TGS (Spectrum) is a company who specialises 
in geo-surveys and makes money by selling their data to oil prospectors; they keep the rights 
to the data and speculate in getting their investment back by selling the data. TGS stand to 
gain from the auctioning of oil exploration licenses, as oil companies may be interested in 
purchasing their survey data and are therefore actively backing the Ministry of Petroleum in 
advancing the oil licensing round.33
Foreign countries and external oil interests in Somalia
26. Many foreign countries will be aware of and interested in the potential oil and gas reserves 
in Somalia given both its potential geopolitical importance as well as commercial profits. 
The United Kingdom, Norway and the United States are three countries that stand out in this 
regard, but Qatar, UAE, Turkey, Kenya and Ethiopia are also amongst countries with interests 
in the Somali oil and gas sector. 
27. The international donor countries, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as 
the World Bank and IMF, also eye future oil extraction as a major revenue that would enable 
Somalia to serve future development loans, which would become available once Somalia 
reaches the debt relief completion point.34 Thus, debt relief and oil sector development are 
linked.
28. The UK’s interest in this sector developed alongside its leadership of a renewed state-building 
programme under David Cameron’s government. The controversial Soma Oil case illustrated 
30 Shell clings firmly to its concession, Africa Intelligence, 01/03/2013, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_
business/2013/03/01/shell-clings-firmly-to-its-concession,107947287-gra 
31 Such as Range Resources and Africa Oil Corp in Puntland, Liberty Petroleum in Galmudug, and Genel Energy and RAK Gas in Somaliland.
32 Kearns, H. Berryman, J. Hodgson, N. and Rodriguez, K. (2016) Offshore Somalia: East Africa’s Oil Frontier, Spectrum, GeoExpro Magazine, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, 2016 https://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2016/05/offshore-somalia-east-africa-s-oil-frontier 
33 Somalia to auction oil blocks starting August, Goobjoog News, May 13, 2020. http://goobjoog.com/english/somalia-to-auctiong-oil-blocks-
starting-august/ 
34 See: See CRP memo on debt relief and the political marketplace: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme/
publications/memos 
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this, which came under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in 2015 but was ultimately 
dropped referencing insufficient evidence. Several analysts perceive UK Aid to be partially 
aligned with areas of high hydrocarbon potential, though it is worth noting that some of 
these areas are also areas with long-term vulnerable and marginalised populations.
29. Several interviewees suggest that US engagement in Somalia reflects an increasing 
awareness of the potential of hydrocarbon finds, following the more recent surveying. In 
2017, the US Ambassador to Somalia encouraged American oil companies to consider 
investing in Somalia.35 The US is likely interested in protecting the old legacy concessions 
(Exxon, Conoco, Chevron, Amoco), which involves a major part of the onshore deposits. The 
UK may be working to protect overlapping interests with the US with regards to the joint 
Shell/Exxon offshore concessions and the BP (former Amoco) legacy concessions. The US 
may also be interested in preventing global rivals such as China from accessing Somali oil 
and gas.
30. Furthermore, several analysts claim that both the US and UK have been deeply involved in 
the political disputes and government selection processes in the Federal Member States, 
in particular South-West State, Jubaland and Galmudug, with the main underlying rationale 
being influence over prospective oil resources.36 
31. Unlike the United States and United Kingdom, Norway does not have legacy concessions to 
protect, however, they gained an important entry point through ex-Prime Minister, Hassan 
Ali Khaire, a Norwegian citizen, who has a background in this sector through his association 
with Soma Oil.37 Norway has been providing capacity building and technical support to 
the Ministry of Petroleum,38 and Spectrum Geo (now merged with TGS) is a Norwegian 
company. Norway is of course an oil producer itself and can bring expertise and guidance 
to Somalia, but nevertheless can fall victim to the dynamics of the political marketplace.
32. Arab state rivalries have also been playing out in Somalia in recent years, reflecting 
tensions and conflict in the Gulf, as well as maritime competition and expanding trade 
opportunities.39 The UAE and Turkey for example, are major investors in Somali ports, 
which will be key for any future oil operations. Turkey has been formally invited to become 
involved in offshore oil exploration, as part of an MoU signed in late 2019.40 
33. Neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia are also highly relevant parties, in terms of trade relations 
as well as in relation to oil. As indicated earlier the maritime dispute with Kenya concerns 
hydrocarbon finds. Ethiopia’s stance towards Somalia has changed considerably since 
the election of President Abiy Ahmed, and while it has its own oil extraction process 
underway in its Somali Regional State, being landlocked Ethiopia has potential interests in 
establishing oil pipelines to the Somali coast, such as through the seaport of Hobyo, which 
is relatively close to the major oil fields in the Somali region of Ethiopia.   
35 See:  http://goobjoog.com/english/american-oil-exploration-invested-in-somalia-says-us-diplomat/
36 Hussein Salah Kassim, Yet another British ploy in Somalia, April 02 2019, https://hornpost.net/2019/04/02/yet-another-british-ploy-in-
somalia/ ; Abdirahman Omar, The US Joins The Scramble Somalia’s Oil, May 16 2019, https://hornpost.net/2019/05/16/the-us-joins-the-
scramble-somalias-oil/ ; http://goobjoog.com/english/american-oil-exploration-invested-in-somalia-says-us-diplomat/.
37 https://www.radiodalsan.com/en/2019/04/29/norways-oil-agenda-in-somalia/ 
38 Email communication with NORAD.
39 https://hornpost.net/2019/03/31/why-saudi-arabia-qatar-and-turkey-are-battling-over-somalia/
40 https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2020/02/turkey-set-up-mechanism-to-explore-oil-gas-and-mining-opportunities-in-somalia/ 
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Somali Actors and Dynamics around Oil Funds in the Political 
Marketplace
34. Until the recent withdrawal of Prime Minister Hassan Khaire, the ruling cabal in Mogadishu 
were commonly referred to as the FFK.41 This cabal represent a centralising ‘turn’ in Somalia’s 
political evolution that has led to well documented tensions with the Federal Member States, 
evident in regional elections since 2018, as well as with opposition groups in the capital, 
Mogadishu. These individuals and networks represent political elites (and their various 
backers) vying for power, influence, and access to resources within Somalia’s Federal system. 
35. Control over the Ministry of Petroleum  and the Somalia Petroleum Authority is of key interest 
in the political dynamics and positioning within the oil and gas sector, as these institutions 
will control oil and gas licensing and resources in the short run as well as in the long run as 
or if institutionalization of the Somali government develops. Until very recently, most of the 
post-civil war efforts at initiating oil extraction in Somalia had been based on personal and 
illicit deals, and/or by opaque contracts without any proper legal regulatory frameworks. The 
development of the Ministry of Petroleum and the SPA provide a structure through which 
control must now be established by interested and competing parties. 
36. Research for this memo finds, unsurprisingly, that the Ministry of Petroleum appeared to be 
under the tight control of the (ex-) Prime Minister and the President respectively, who were 
at times collaborating and at other times competing for control. A political marketplace 
framework – and the opinion of many analysts – suggests that the short-term control over 
resources that is a principal goal in elite politics in Somalia, particularly in advance of an 
election. These resources concern a) potential payment of fees, rents, and other inducements 
(which have already been taking place over the years, at a small scale), and b) the sub-
contracts that will materialise with exploration agreements. Positioning to benefit from this, 
through the appointments of key positions, is already part of the activities of this marketplace. 
The recent appointments of the Somalia Petroleum Authority (SPA) is an example of this kind 
of practice.
37. In terms of fees and payments, examples are already evident, such as with the US $1.7m 
payments by Shell and Exxon and the earlier Soma Oil share allocation to ex-PM Hassan 
Khaire. The size of the political budgets in Somalia have been and still are relatively small 
compared to other similar countries.  Usually the “winning” conglomerates are successful 
because they achieve control over the larger sources of funds to be used in political budgets. 
However, political conglomerates - or firms - in the Somali context are rarely very fixed blocks 
as individuals easily shift sides as opportunities arise.  In other words, no individual actors or 
groups in Somalia’s fragmented political scene can dominate others. However, although these 
funds are relatively modest, they can still play a significant role in paying off parliamentarians 
and other necessary political bribes in the political games associated with election periods, 
which may improve election (or re-election) chances. 
38. The provision of logistics, security, accommodation and hospitality services are already well-
established in Somalia, and have long been part of the political economy of aid, particularly 
in the humanitarian sector.42 Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), both 
international and Somali have been providing these services for many years, as a recent 
CRP memo discussed.43 As, or if, commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits are identified, 
infrastructure will be required, such as roads, pipelines, storage facilities, port facilities and 
airstrips, which will provide further contracting opportunities. There  are already Somali 
businessmen who were previously involved in food aid contracting and who have moved into 
41FFK refers to President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo), (now ex-) Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire and the Director General of the 
National Intelligence and Security Agency, Fahad Yasin Dahir.
42 See: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103138/ 
43 See: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Conflict-Research-Programme/crp-memos/Norman-private-military-mogadishu-final.
pdf 
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construction and down-stream petroleum services who are likely to be seeking contracts that 
may be derived from infrastructural projects and other investments related to development of 
the oil and gas sector.44 
39. The potential development of the oil and gas sector also sees an interesting connection 
with the debt relief process, as newly available loans and grants may provide the finance for 
infrastructure development to support oil exploration and extraction, and which would be paid 
back with revenues from this sector.45 
40. When considering the immediate returns as well as the medium to longer term returns, the 
stakes are high in the hydrocarbon sector in Somalia, for the Somali political (and business) 
elite. A key part of the dynamic of the political marketplace will be to ensure that one’s ‘own 
people’ are firmly in control of all the key posts that control and regulate oil exploration 
licensing and production sharing agreements. Therefore, the rationale behind the political 
games concerning petroleum regulations and laws, and the resulting delays, in recent years, 
is essentially about securing ‘your people’ into key positions. The political game surrounding 
the controversial appointment of the SPA is an example of this. The FGS and foreign actors 
meddling in the power struggles over the selection of leadership in the FMS is another 
example; the FMS appoints most of the SPA members. 
41. Furthermore, prior to 2012, oil funds and related revenue primarily played into regional actors’ 
hands, and while payments to regional authorities did not necessarily amount to much, 
they would most likely have been influential in the local political marketplace. The Soma Oil 
arrangement in 2011/12 changed this dynamic with a major foreign government supporting a 
private ‘oil’ company in the complete absence of legislation and regulation. 
Conclusions
42. This study has outlined the growing significance of hydrocarbons to Somalia’s geopolitical 
position and in turn to the dynamics of the political marketplace. The establishment of the 
federal government in Mogadishu, in 2012, has changed the organisation of this sector 
bringing it under a central authority where for years previously arrangements were made 
with regional authorities; this development has inevitably caused or contributed to tensions 
between the FGS and the FMSs, evident since late 2018. 
43. The development of the legislative and regulatory framework and agencies is still unfinished 
but now frames the operation of the political marketplace, with control over the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Somalia Petroleum Agency constituting the key motivations of political elites 
and associated bargaining. Control of these ‘institutions’ enables access to informal flows 
of money as well as allows control over the allocation of sub-contracts, which are likely to 
come from the various grants and loans that will become available through the debt relief 
process. Control over contracts is a major issue in Somalia’s political economy and political 
marketplace.46 
44. As this memo illustrates for the oil and gas sector, the dynamics of the political marketplace 
involve speculation as to both short-term and long-term revenues; in the latter case the 
potential reserves in Somalia may ultimately not be commercially viable or accessible although 
they are clearly attracting the interest of many actors. 
45. It is also important to note that 2020 has seen the swift - although controversial - passing of 
necessary legislation and the appointments of positions in key institutions, such as the Judicial 
Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission and the Somalia Petroleum Authority. The 
44 See: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103138/ 
45 See CRP Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace memo: https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/projects/conflict-research-programme/publications/
memos 
46 See: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/04/30/humanitarian-response-covid-19-somalia-capital-flight-debt-relief-violence/  
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fact that these processes have taken place appears to reflect that a consolidation of power 
within the President’s office has taken place. 
46. The agreements with Soma Oil (Coastal Exploration) and TGS (Spectrum) were controversial 
and still cast a shadow over the Somali petroleum sector. Without the regulating effect of 
the Petroleum Law and the regulatory institutions in place, the Government did not have a 
legitimate right to enter contracts with foreign petroleum exploration companies in the first 
place. If credibility around the Somali petroleum sector is to be re-established, the FGS and 
the Ministry of Petroleum need to bring clarity and transparency to the current status of these 
contracts. 
47. The recent low oil market and price, further reduced by the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the 
shift to green technologies in response to climate change, all raise questions as to the even-
tual viability of hydrocarbon extraction in Somalia. Nevertheless, the FGS’s (assisted by TGS) 
push for exploration continues unabated, and with an apparent silent acceptance by the inter-
national community. 
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Annex I.
Outstanding legislative and regulatory issues: 
• The Model PSA must be aligned with the requirements of the Procurement Act. All tendering 
and award of oil and gas concessions is governed by the provisions of both the 2016 
Procurement Act and 2020 Petroleum Act. 
• The fiscal terms of the Model PSA must be aligned with the Extractives Industries Income Tax 
(EIIT) Bill. Enactment of the EIIT Bill is a HIPC Completion Point benchmark. 
• Other elements include the development of the capacities of accountability and oversight 
institutions, i.e. judiciary, parliamentary committees, constitutional court etc. For instance, 
there is also a need for establishing clarity on and strengthening the parliamentary and FMS 
oversight over MoPMR and SPA activities.
• The National Resources Council or Commission also need to be set up according to the 
Baidoa Agreement.
• Somaliland’s (SL) claim for independence even though it lacks international recognition needs 
to be solved. Currently SL has issued its own licenses to Genel Energy & RAK Gas, and are 
pursuing their own Petroleum Law and PSAs.
• Some Federal Members States, Puntland in particular, has consistently not recognized the 
SPA nor the Petroleum Law, because they see their influence over oil exploration under their 
territory diminished and under centralized control. Tis questions the status of the SPA as well 
as the Petroleum Law given the spirit of federalism as set out in the provisional Constitution of 
Somalia  
• The actual status and role of the existing agreements with Soma Oil (now Coastal Exploration) 
and TGS (Spectrum) and needs to be clarified and documented to the public. 
• The Petroleum Law requires holders of legacy rights to convert them into PSAs by February 
2021 or lose their rights. This could lead to another controversy given the deficiencies of the 
institutional and legal framework and the ongoing political election crisis. 
• Finally, Somalia has not signed up for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), which is the global standards for good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources 
management.
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